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Accepted 22 September 2008tical framework for a retrospective analysis for well-observed livestock epidemics
during which intervention policies may conceal cases, thus potentially biasing naively derived parameter and
ﬁnal size estimates. We apply the methods to the 2001 foot and mouth epidemic (FMD) in Great Britain,
during which a large number of farms (about 7500) were pre-emptively culled as part of the control effort
without ever being diagnosed as being infected. We infer farm-level infectivity and susceptibility parameters,
a distribution for the delay from infection to report, together with a time varying farm infectivity proﬁle for
farms. Hidden infections among proactively culled farms were accounted for using a data augmentation
approach utilising reversible jump MCMC methods. Simulated epidemics derived using the parameter
estimates obtained reproduced the 2001 epidemic well. Our analysis demonstrates that time-varying
infectivity proﬁles ﬁt the 2001 data better than naive assumptions of constant infectiousness. We estimate
that around 210 (or 2.8%) of the farms proactively culled in the 2001 epidemic were infected. However, for
the parameter estimated obtained, preliminary simulation results indicate that had contiguous culling not
been applied in 2001, the epidemic might have been substantially larger.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Thousands of farms were pre-emptively culled as part of the effort
to control the 2001 FMD epidemic in Great Britain. This controversial
use of large scale culling was suggested by the results of mathematical
modelling (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Keeling
et al., 2001) which concluded that either radial culling or vaccination
would be needed to contain the outbreak. The necessity of the cull of
contiguous premises (CP) adopted in 2001 has remained a con-
troversial issue however, with criticisms being made of some of the
assumptions made by the models developed during the outbreak
(Haydon et al., 2004; Kitching et al., 2007). Here we examine how
much it is possible to infer about the effectiveness and necessity of
control measures adopted during the 2001 outbreak from the
epidemiological data collected at the time. In particular, canwe assess
the impact contiguous culling had on transmission and the level of
hidden infection in farms that were pre-emptively culled?
Data from real outbreaks of infection diseases are usually less
complete than one might desire for statistical inference purposes and
2001 FMD epidemic is no exception. The infection process is
unobserved and the only precise information available is the timing
of the report or diagnosis of infection on farms, and of the depo-ter).
worth Laboratories, the School
y of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9
-NC-ND license.pulation of farms. Given the widespread use of culling to control FMD
outbreaks, there is also uncertainty about whether all infected
premises (IPs) are detected — infected animals may be culled before
symptom onset on pre-emptively culled farms. This is a particular
issue for the 2001 outbreak, where very large numbers of farms were
depopulated under the Dangerous Contact (DC) and CP culling
policies. Accounting for hidden infections in inferential models
designed to estimate epidemiological parameters from outbreak
data is subject to computationally intensive methodologies among
other challenges, and for that reason has been largely ignored in
previous studies (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Diggle, 2006; Chis Ster,
2007).There are also some epidemiological justiﬁcations for simplify-
ing inference in this way, at least to obtain ﬁrst-pass estimates, since it
is known that infectiousness peaks in symptomatic animals (Alex-
andersen et al., 2003a,b). Thus it is perhaps reasonable to assume that
farms which were not diagnosed at the point of culling (and which
thereforemust have had few if any symptomatic animals) contributed
little overall to onward transmission. Thus assuming pre-emptively
culled farms as being non-infectious is expected to only slightly bias
estimates (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Chis Ster, 2007).
Here we extend earlier work developing a Bayesian Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC)-based model for epidemic inference (Chis Ster,
2007) to incorporate the possibility of infections being unobserved
due to censoring caused by pre-emptive culling. A variety of past work
has showed MCMC Bayesian methods to be powerful tools for
extracting the maximum possible epidemiological information from
closely observed outbreaks (O'Neill and Roberts, 1999; Britton and
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reversible jump MCMC (RJMCMC) methods (Green, 1995; Gibson and
Renshaw, 1998; Auranen et al., 2000; Cauchemez et al., 2006) to
account for hidden infections, where we view the infection times of all
farms as ‘nuisance’ parameters, with the dimensionality of the
resulting parameter space becoming variable due to the uncertainty
in the number of farms infected. Signiﬁcant attention has been paid to
goodness of ﬁt and model choice methodologies for systems with
variable dimension for parameter spaces (Gibson and Renshaw,1998),
(Spiegelhalter et al., 2002) and they are still the subject of intensive
theoretical research. We take a simpler approach to model compa-
rison here and just compare log likelihood values, an approach
justiﬁed by the very similar parameter space dimensionality we ﬁnd
for all model variants.
Despite ever-increasing available computer power, the computa-
tional challenges of ﬁtting a non-linear, spatially-localised model of
transmission to a relatively large dataset remain considerable: the
dimensionality of the RJMCMC parameter space is high (several
thousand parameters), and computation of the overall likelihood
involves summing individual log likelihoods over 130,000 premises in
total.
Overall, the methods developed here can be readily adapted to
analyse any infectious disease outbreak where detailed data are
available on individual cases and individuals in the host population:
for instance, to analyse data from other livestock outbreaks (such as
highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza), or emerging human outbreaks
(e.g. SARS, Ebola) — though for many human diseases, social
structuring of the population is more important than pure spatial
locality as a risk factor for disease spread.
Data sources
Our data consist of information on all the farms in the UK listed in
the 2000 agricultural census. There were a total of 134,986 farms
listed in that dataset and uniquely identiﬁed by their County/Parish/
Holding (CPH) number. Their spatial coordinates are provided
together with the number of animals by species within each farm.
During the 2001 FMD outbreak, a total of 2026 infected premises
(IPs) were recorded — farms where FMD was diagnosed, and which
were subsequently culled. The IP dataset contains, for each farm, theFig. 1. Daily culling incidence stratiﬁed by culling poestimated date of infection (determined by a clinical evaluation of the
age of lesions on affected animals), and the dates of disease reporting,
conﬁrmation and culling.
In addition, a total of 7455 farms with cattle and/or sheep were
proactively culled during the outbreak (around 200 pig-only farms
were culled, but not considered in this analysis) and those also later
designated as IPs. Approximately 17% (1241) of these proactively
culled farms were classiﬁed as DCs, 41% (3058) as contiguous
premises (CPs), with a further 36% (2704) being culled under the
so-called ‘3 km’ sheep-only radial cull policy and the remaining 6%
(452) under other local policies. The daily pre-emptive culling
incidences (Figs. 1b–d) broadly mirrored the progress of the
epidemic (Fig. 1a), though the 3 km policy was only implemented
for a 2 month period early in the epidemic (approximately mid
March to end May).
Geographically, the culling took place in the three regions of the
country which were the main foci of the epidemic. In the Northern
region (with Cumbria as main focus), some 5231 farms were
depopulated, representing 70% of all culling. The Midlands region
(i.e. Welsh borders) had approx 1191 farms culled (16% of all culling),
and the Southern region (centring on Devon) lost 1033 farms (14% of
all culling). The distribution of culled farms match that of IPs across
the regions: 72% in the North (where there were 1456 IPs), 14% in the
Midlands (where there were 275 IPs), and 14% in the South (where
there were 280 IPs). In the North, 71% (3719) of proactively-culled
farms were depopulated under the 3 km local policy, which only
removed sheep. The North accounted for a smaller proportion of other
culling — 50% (627 farms) of all farms culled as DCs were in that
region, and 58% (1783 farms) of all CP culls.
Stratifying by species, overall 772 cattle-only farms were proac-
tively culled (representing 10% of all farms culled) followed by 1746
farms with sheep and cattle (24% of all farms culled) and 4937 sheep
only farms (66% of all farms culled). Around 5807 farms (78%) were
proactively culled before 10th May and only 1648 after that date.
Overall, 89% (about 1788 farms) of the IPswere culledwithin 2 days of
being reported, about10% (197 farms)within3 to6days andonly1.3% (26
farms) had a longer than 6 day delay to culling (maximumdelay recorded
was 15 days). This varied regionally, with the North of the country
recording the longest delays: 65% (or 129) of all those between 3 and
6 days and a similar percentage of all the delays between 7 and 15 days.licy: (a) IP; (b) DC; (c) CP; (d) 3 km radial cull.
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Previous work suggested that models conditioned on 23rd
February, the date of national movement ban (Chis Ster, 2007) are
equally informative as those conditioned on the ﬁrst infection. We
extend the simple spatial transmission model used in our and others'
past papers (Keeling et al., 2001, 2003; Chis Ster, 2007) in 2 ways: (a)
we allow farm infectiousness and susceptibility to vary non-linearly
with the number of animals on the farm, unlike the rather extreme
assumption of linear scaling used previously; (b) we allow the
infectiousness of a farm to vary through time.
Letting Sifarm, Iifarm denote the susceptibility and infectivity of farm
i, we deﬁne:
Sfarmi = RS 1−exp −
nci
DC
  
+ 1−exp − n
s
i
DS
  
Ifarmi = RI 1−exp −
nci
DC
  
+ 1−exp − n
s
i
DS
   ð1Þ
where nic and nis are the number of cattle and sheep on farm i, RS is a
parameter deﬁning the ratio of cattle to sheep susceptibility, RI is the
ratio of cattle to sheep infectiousness, and DS and DC are parameters
deﬁning the scaling of infectiousness and susceptibility with the
number of animals on the farm. We assume that susceptibility and
infectiousness scale in the same way with the number of animals on
the farm, as there was insufﬁcient statistical power to estimate
different parameters for susceptibility and infectiousness. Other
functional forms (e.g. power law) for the relationship between
susceptibility/infectiousness and numbers of animals were examined
and produced very similar results.Table 1
Parameter estimates for 5 model variants
Infectiousness proﬁle Flat model
Reduction in transmission from 26 March to 10 May Yes Yes
Change in transmission after IP report date Yes No
Log likelihood −18,925 −1
(−19,121, −18,736) (−
k=total number of hidden infections 214 20
(179, 252) (18
RS=susceptibility ratio (cattle:sheep) 4.80 4.8
(4.22, 5.44) (4.
RI=infectivity ratio (cattle:sheep) 2.59 2.0
(2.16, 3.10) (1.
β0=baseline transmission coeff. 6351 62
(6259, 6445) (60
DC=farm size scale parameter for cattle 217 218
(201, 232) (19
DS=farm size scale parameter for sheep 39 37
(30, 52) (28
Infection to report distribution mean 8.03 8.0
(7.89, 8.21) (7.
Infection to report distribution variance 6.79 6.7
(6.34, 7.52) (6.
a=spatial kernel offset 1374 139
(1311, 1435) (13
γ=spatial kernel power 2.86 2.8
(2.78,2.94) (2.
δ=increase in transmission before peak and in tail of epidemic 1.24 1.2
(1.12, 1.34) (1.
η=factor reduction in IP infectiousness post report 43 –
(28,56)
Day post infection infectiousness peaks – –
Infectiousness proﬁle power – –
Latent period 0.47 (0.21) 0.3
(0.06, 0.88) (0.
A 1 day standard deviation for the priors on IP infection times was assumed. Posterior means
ﬁgures corresponds to the model variant shown in the far right column.It should be noted that for values of DS and DC much larger than
the number of sheep or cattle on a farm, linear scaling of susceptibility
and infectiousness with the number of cattle and sheep on a farm is
regained, as assumed by earlier models (Keeling et al., 2001, 2003;
Chis Ster, 2007). For smaller values of DS and DC, these functional
forms allow susceptibility and infectiousness to saturate with
increasing numbers of animals. For very small DS and DC, the other
extreme of susceptibility and infectiousness being independent of
farm size is reached. Other functional forms are possible (e.g. power
law dependence, Tildesley et al., 2006), but give similar qualitative
behaviour.
The localised nature of contacts between farms is modelled using a
kernel function depending on the distance between farms(Chis Ster,
2007).We use an offset power form, which gives an asymptotic power
law dependence on distance but saturates at short distances:
k dij
 
=
γ−1ð Þ γ−2ð Þ
a2
1+
dij
a
 −γ
ð2Þ
where dij is the Euclidean distance between farms i and j, and a and γ
are the kernel parameters. The initial constant factor is a normal-
isation coefﬁcient, as we normalise the kernel function in the two-
dimensional plane so as to make the total rate at which one farm
makes contacts with other farms approximately independent of the
kernel parameters, thus reducing correlations between the baseline
transmission coefﬁcient and kernel parameters.
We also allow for the possibility of the infectiousness of a farm
changing after infection has been reported on the farm. This
represents the potential impact of restrictions being imposed on theGamma function
No Yes Yes
No Yes No
8,985 −18,917 −18,863 −18,905
19,114, −18,868) (−19,076, −18,910) (−19,020, −18,741) (−19,054, −18,751)
5 207 206 207
2, 229) (176, 252) (184, 230) (179, 233)
8 5.00 4.87 5.04
16, 5.56) (4.25, 5.79) (4.30, 5.77) (4.21, 5.97)
3 2.07 2.53 2.07
72, 2.54) (1.48, 2.68) (2.04,3.03) (1.56, 2.70)
99 7213 6312 6311
50, 6452) (7028, 7398) (6212, 6406) (6231, 6399)
215 220 214
7, 236) (198, 232) (206, 239) (192, 235)
34 39 37
, 52) (23,47) (29,52) (28, 48)
4 8.08 8.06 8.07
91, 8.21) (7.96, 8.23) (7.95, 8.20) (7.95, 8.20)
0 6.62 6.67 6.67
28, 7.30) (6.13, 7.16) (6.20, 7.13) (6.20, 7.13)
0 1392 1383 1380
42, 1438) (1330, 1435) (1335, 1440) (1321, 1436)
7 2.86 (0.03) 2.84 2.84
82,2.93) (2.79, 2.92) (2.77, 2.93) (2.77, 2.91)
0 – 1.2 1.17
07, 1.32) (1.09, 1.34) (1.05, 1.31)
– 31 –
(21, 43)
3.37 3.53 3.42
(3.16, 3.53) (1.34, 4.58) (3.23, 3.58)
2.55 0.53 2.43
(1.70, 3.31) (0.07, 1.20) (1.85, 3.26)
6 (0.13) – – –
11, 0.63)
and 95% credible intervals are shown. The default model used for most other tables and
Fig. 2. (a) Comparison of the farm infectiousness functional proﬁle calculated using the
mean posterior parameter estimates for the models with and without a drop in
infectiousness after IP report date from this ﬁgure; (b) comparison of the average farm
infectiousness proﬁle over time for all IPs including the impact of drops in
infectiousness due to reporting and culling for the models with and without a drop
in infectiousness after IP report date.
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Cj tð Þ= 1=η; if t N reporting date of farm j1; otherwise

ð3Þ
We account for potential overall temporal changes in transmission
rates via a time-varying function U(t). For most of the results
presented below, we assume this takes the form of a step function:
U tð Þ= δ; if t before 26
th March after 10th May
1; otherwise

ð4Þ
This functionality is suggested by the shape of the epidemic curve
(Kao, 2002; Chis Ster, 2007). It allows for an increase in the overall
transmission until its peak (approx 26th March) followed by a decline
until the beginning of the tail (approx 10th May). Another increase is
meant to be associated with the sustained long tail of the epidemic.
Ideally, one would like to estimate different parameters regimes for
the three periods of time, but we experienced identiﬁably problems.
Last, we deﬁne the relative infectiousness of a farm time τ after
infection as f(τ), where f(τ)=0 for τ≤0. The overall hazard imposed
by farm j on farm i at time t is then given by
λij tð Þ= β0Cj tð Þf t−tIj
 
Sfarmi I
farm
j U tð Þk dij
  ð5Þ
where β0 is the baseline transmission coefﬁcient, and tjI is the
infection time of farm j.
In this paper we examine two forms for f(τ). First, a smooth but
steeply changing functional form approximating a non-infectious
latent period followed by constant infectiousness:
f τð Þ=
0; if τVmax 0; l−2ð Þ
1− 1
1+ τ− 1−2ð Þ½ 4
; if τNmax 0; l−2ð Þ
8<: ð6Þ
Here l is the latent period-like parameter to be estimated. Overall,
this is a discrete time model so f(τ) is only evaluated at integer values
of τ. Since f(0)=0 by deﬁnition, values of 0≤ lb1 give values of f(1)N
0.94 — approximating the minimum 1 day latent period (imposed by
our use of a 1 day time step) and then constant infectiousness.
Because time values take integer units of days, we did not use a pure
step function to model a ﬁxed latent period, as continuous changes in
the latent period parameter of less than an integer step then have no
effect on the model likelihood, while crossing an integer boundary
causes large likelihood changes. This inhibited mixing of the MCMC
chain, making estimation of the latent period impossible. The
continuous functional form given above avoided this problem.
The second functional form we explored for f(τ) was a gamma
function:
f τð Þ= τα1 exp −α2τð Þ; τN0 ð7Þ
where α1 and α2 are the parameters to be estimated. This form was
intended to be a crude representation of the possible effect of within-
farm transmission dynamics allowing infectiousness to initially rise on
a farm and then declining after the peak of the within-farm epidemic.
This basic transmission model was used both within a Bayesian
RJMCMC based inference framework (see Appendix A for details) and
a simulation model (see Appendix B for details).
Results
We ﬁtted models with the two types of infectiousness proﬁle over
time described above: the ﬂat and the gamma proﬁle as given in Eqs.
(6) and (7), respectively. For each of these, we ﬁtted model variants in
which farm infectiousness was allowed to drop after the farm was
reported (representing the effect of restrictions on diagnosed IPs), orwas unaffected by report (infectiousness was always assumed to be
zero after an IP was culled). We also generally ﬁtted a parameter
which reduced overall transmission rates by a ﬁxed factor in the
period of fastest decline of the epidemic (26th March–10th May),
though a model variant without such a factor was also ﬁtted for the
gamma function infectiousness proﬁle. This choice of time window
was motivated by estimates of transmission in past work (Ferguson
et al., 2001a,b; Chis Ster, 2007).
Parameter estimates for the 5 resulting model variants are shown
in Table 1. We found evidence that the baseline transmission was
about 17% (5%, 31%) lower during the period 26th March–10th May
than before or after that period. We had insufﬁcient statistical power
to estimate transmission rates in the period prior to 26th March
separately from those after 10th May.
It can be seen from Table 1 that the gamma function infectiousness
proﬁle gave better log likelihood values than either of the ﬂat
infectiousness model variants. There are reversible jump style meth-
odologies choosing between different models (Gibson and Renshaw,
1998), but the relatively similar dimensionality (given the estimated
number of hidden infections in Table 1) allows a more straightforward
(log-likelihood type) comparison: models with variable infectiousness
ﬁt better than those with constant infectiousness.
For themodels with a latent period and then ﬂat infectiousness, we
estimated a latent period parameter of l=0.36 (0.11, 0.63) and
l=0.47(0.06, 0.88) for model variants ignoring and accounting for a
drop in infectiousness after IP report, respectively. Since these values
correspond to a farm reaching nearly full infectiousness the day after it
Table 2
Number of hidden infections among proactively culled farms stratiﬁed by cull policy,
estimated from the default model
Total DC CP 3 km policy Other
Number 207 51 109 40 7
(179, 233) (41, 63) (88, 128) (29, 53) (3, 11)
% of group 2.8% 4.2% 3.6% 1.5% 1.5%
(2.4%, 3.2 %) (3.1%, 5.3%) (3.9%, 4.3%) (1.1%, 2.0%) (0.4%, 2.7%)
Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals shown.
25I. Chis Ster et al. / Epidemics 1 (2009) 21–34is infected, they suggest that if there is a non infectious farm-level
latent period for FMD, it is short.
Models with infectiousness varying as a gamma function through
time predict a peak in infectiousness around days 3–4 (Fig. 2a), but the
exact shape of the infectiousness proﬁle strongly depends on whether
a drop in infectiousness after the report date of IPs is ﬁtted (parameter
η, see model description). Such a drop might represent the impact of
restrictions placed on farms after FMD infection is suspected — a
reasonable conclusion given the rapid and intensive measures imposed
on IPs as soon as suspected infection is reported (e.g. bans on non-
essential movements on and off the farm, warning notices, disinfectant
baths, gathering in of stock). The estimated infectiousness proﬁle is
ﬂatter when such a drop is ﬁtted (Fig. 2a). If one then calculates the
average infectiousness over time for all IPs taking account of the actual
distribution of infection-to-report delays and both the infectiousness
proﬁles and drop in infectiousness after report (Fig. 2b), the distinction
between the 2 models is much less pronounced.
The only cause to hesitate in endorsing themore complexmodel as
a better description of the epidemic is the very large drop in
infectiousness predicted to occur after an IP is reported — a 30–40
fold reduction (which is also seen for the ﬂat infectiousness proﬁle
model variant), meaning farms are predicted to be essentially non-
infectious after report. This magnitude of drop is perhaps epidemio-
logically implausible, though also not entirely unreasonable (see
Discussion). Certainly, if restrictions on individual IPs were actually
that effective in 2001, then it implies that the efforts to reduce the
delay from report to cull of IPs had almost no impact (since IPs were
already non-infectious after report) — and therefore proactive culling
must have had the dominant role in controlling the epidemic. Since
we wish to be conservative in our assessment of the impact of
proactive culling, we therefore take the model with time-varying
infectiousness but no ﬁtted drop in infectiousness after IP report asFig. 3. Posterior distributions for the estimated number of hidden infections for the model w
(a) all proactively culled farms; (b) DC culls; (c) CP culls; (d) 3 km policy culls; (e) MCMour default model when reporting estimates below. With the
exception of the parameters governing farms' infectiousness over
time, the parameters estimates for this model are in any case nearly
identical to the model allowing for a drop in infectiousness (Table 1).
All model variants (Table 1) produce very consistent estimates of
the number of hidden infections among proactively culled farms, with
the default model giving a mean posterior estimate of 207 with 95%
credible range of (179, 233) — representing 3.4% of all proactively
culled farms (Parameters estimates for 5 model variants. A 1 day
standard deviation for the priors on IP infection times was assumed.
Posterior means and 95% credible intervals are shown. The default
model used for most other tables and ﬁgures corresponds to the
model variant shown in the far right column, Table 2).
Examination of the posterior distributions Figs. 3a–d indicate that
the numbers of hidden infections overall and within each class of
proactively culled farm are estimated with reasonable precision. A
trace for the accepted log likelihood values proves the MCMC-
integration convergence (Fig. 3e).
Stratifying by the different culling policies, the highest levels of
infection (4.2%) were seen among those farms culled as DCs (Table 2),
though it should be noted that since our inference procedure does not
allow for the prior knowledge of exposure which goes into the
designation of a farm as a DC, this ﬁgure may be an underestimate. CP
culls were the next best targeted, with 3.6% of farms being infected,
while infection rates among other culled farms (namely those culled
under the 3 km and local culls) were as low as 1.5%.
Stratifying by the type or region of farm (Table 3) indicates that
infection rates were highest in farms culled in the North (3.1%), and in
farms with both cattle and sheep (5.4%). Sheep-only farms — the
majority of farms culled — had much lower infection rates (1.8%).
Transmission parameter estimates are broadly similar to those
from our previous work (Chis Ster, 2007) and qualitatively consistent
with those published in 2001 (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Keeling et al.,
2001). Cattle were found to be substantially more infective and
susceptible than sheep. Cattle-to-sheep susceptibility and infectivity
ratio parameters were estimated for the baseline model to be 5.04
(4.21, 5.97) and 2.07(1.56, 2.70) respectively (Table 1).
However, we estimate that farm susceptibility and infectiousness
scale far from linearly with the number of animals on a farm (Fig. 4a),
questioning assumptions made in past work (Keeling et al., 2001,
2003; Tildesley et al., 2006; Chis Ster, 2007). While scaling of
susceptibility and infectiousness of cattle farms is relatively linearith variable infectiousness but no drop in IP infectiousness after report shown in Fig. 2:
C trace — the log likelihood.
Table 3
Estimated numbers of hidden infections stratiﬁed by region and by farm species
Estimate
By region South (1033 farms culled) Number 29 (22, 39)
% of group 2.9% (1.9%, 3.9%)
Midlands (1191 farms culled) Number 18 (11, 25)
% of group 1.4 % (0.8%, 2.1 %
North (5231 farms culled) Number 160 (137, 184)
% of group 3.1% (2.6%, 3.7%)
By species Cattle only (772 farms culled) Number 26 (18, 37)
% of group 3.5% (2.2 %, 4.8%)
Sheep only (4937 farms culled) Number 87 (70, 105)
% of group 1.8% (1.6%, 2.4%)
Mixed species (1746 farms culled) Number 93 (77, 110)
% of group 5.4% (4.3%, 6.4%)
Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for the default model shown.
26 I. Chis Ster et al. / Epidemics 1 (2009) 21–34for farms with under about 150 cows (true for the majority of cattle
farms), it becomes increasingly sub-linear for larger cattle farms. For
sheep, the situation is even more striking — we estimate that sheep
farms with only 50 animals were only 25% less susceptible and
infectious than a farm with 1000 animals or more (Fig. 4a). This
suggests that within-farm spread was generally slow in large sheep
farms, resulting in low prevalence levels.
Overall, our new estimates of the spatial kernel function (Fig. 4b)
are very comparable with those obtained in from previous studies
(Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Keeling et al., 2001; Chis Ster, 2007).
Allowing for hidden infections gives a slightly more localised kernel
(since a higher density of infections overall shortens the expected
distance between infectious farms and the farms they infect) — with
the parameter determining the power-law decay of the kernel
estimated here as 2.84 (2.77, 2.91) compared with 2.67 (2.58, 2.8)
in our past work (Chis Ster, 2007). The only signiﬁcant difference
between the kernels shown in Fig. 4b are that the function used by
Keeling et al., (2001) has a higher probability of contacts within
0.5 km of an IP, and a lower probability between 0.5 km and about
3 km. This is likely to result in models using the Keeling kernel
attributing a slightly higher impact of very local control policies (such
as CP culling) than models which use our kernel estimates.
The other key parameters estimated by our inference model are
those determining the infection-to-report delay time distribution. Our
ability to estimate this distribution is determined by the use of
informative priors around the estimated infection times generated by
veterinary dating of lesions from infected animals on IPs for the
unobserved infection dates of the cases.Whenwe try to infer infection
dates (and the infection-to-report distribution) using uninformative
priors (and even if we ignored the possibility of hidden infections), we
failed to get satisfactory convergence in theMCMC chains— indicating
that some prior knowledge is needed to simultaneously estimateFig. 4. (a) Scaling of farm infectiousness and susceptibility with number of cattle or sheep o
number of animals; (b) Newly estimated spatial kernel (calculated frommean posterior estim
et al., 2001a,b; Keeling et al., 2001; Chis Ster, 2007). All kernel functions were normalised itransmission rates and generation time distributions. Our default
priors for IP infection dates used a normal distribution (right-
truncated by the report date) centred on the lesion-dating derived
estimated infection date, and with a 1 day standard deviation.
Fig. 5 shows the comparison between the infection-to-report delay
distribution inferred by the default model, and the empirical
distribution calculated by assuming the lesion-dating derived infection
time estimates were accurate. Overall, the inferred distribution is
broadly consistent with the empirical distribution, both in temporal
evolution (Figs. 5a–c) and when stratiﬁed by farm type (Figs. 5d–f).
The empirical distribution has a large peak at a 7 day delay from
infection to report which is not fully reproduced by the inferred
distribution. This discrepancy may reﬂect an underlying bias in the
estimates of IP infection dates by veterinarians (i.e. towards saying
infection occurred around a week before the inspection). Figs. 5d–f
show that while the mean infection-to-report delay was similar for all
types of farm, the variance of the distribution was substantially larger
for sheep-only farms. Despite using only a single gamma distribution
to model the infection-to-report distribution (with estimate mean of
8.07 (7.95, 8.20) days and variance of 6.67 (6.20, 7.13) — see Table 1),
these species differences were relatively well reproduced by the
inference model. However, the differences seen suggest that improve-
ments in model ﬁt might be possible by ﬁtting separate distributions
for sheep and cattle.
Figs. 5g–i show that, as expected, making the prior on IP infection
dates less informative (by increasing the standard deviation)
decreases the degree of correspondence between the inferred and
empirical infection-to-report distributions.
For the inferred hidden infections, we estimate that 83% were
infected less than 10 days before their cull date (Fig. 6a). Farms with
cattle were estimated to have been infected closer to their date of
culling than sheep-only farms (Figs. 6b–c). Interestingly, infections on
farms culled as CPs are predicted to have occurred closer to their cull
date than for those culled as DCs (Figs. 6d–e). This is consistent with
there being a delay in identifying DCs relative to the automatic process
of identifying CPs. Also, the average delay from infection to cull for
hidden infections is estimated to have been longer prior to 10th May
than after (Figs. 6g–h), indicating better surveillance and/or more
rapid culling after that date.
In addition to estimating the latent period, we also undertook a
sensitivity analysis where the latent period was assumed rather than
estimated. Conditioning on a 1, 2 or 3 day latent period gave slightly
higher predicted numbers of hidden infections among proactively
culled farms: 238 (95%CI (210, 270)) for 1 day latent period, 243 (95%
CI (209, 271)) for 2 days, and 247 (95%CI (215, 274)) for 3 days,
keeping the hidden infection proportions at a very low level. The
estimated value of the ratio of cattle-to-sheep infectiousness increases
from 2.42 (95%CI (2.02, 2.42)) to 3.17 (95%CI (2.60, 3.69)) as the latentn a farm. For sheep, relative infectiousness and susceptibility scale identically with the
ates from default model) compared with kernels estimated in previous work (Ferguson
n 2 dimensions for comparability.
Fig. 5. Comparison of the empirical (derived using the lesion-dating derived estimated infection dates of IPs) and inferred (using the infection dates estimated by the default model)
infection to report delay distributions for observed cases for: (a) all IPs in the period 23rd Feb–26th March; (b) all IPs in the period 26th March–10th May; (c) all IPs reported from
10thMay onwards; (d) all cattle-only IPs; (e) all sheep-only IPs; (f) all mixed species IPs; (g) all IPs, assuming 1 day standard deviation of the prior on IP infection date (as assumed in
a–f); (h) all IPs, assuming 2 day standard deviation of IP infection date prior; (i) all IPs, assuming 3 day standard deviation of IP infection date prior.
27I. Chis Ster et al. / Epidemics 1 (2009) 21–34period is varied from 1 to 3 days. The trend is similar to the results
obtained in our past work (Chis Ster, 2007) where a shorter infectious
period was compensated by higher transmission parameters.
The literature on formal measures of ﬁt for models with variable
dimension of the parameter space beneﬁts from important contribu-
tions of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) and Celeux et al. (2006). WeFig. 6. The estimated distribution of the time since infection to cull for hidden infections oc
farms; (d) DC culled farms; (e) CP culled farms; (f) farms culled under the 3 km policy; (gevaluated the adequacy of model ﬁt by simulating epidemics using
our estimated parameters and the culling patterns of the 2001
epidemic (see Appendix B). The results indicate that our model
reproduces the temporal (Fig. 7a) and spatial (Fig. 7b) evolution of
the 2001 epidemic well, together with the species-stratiﬁed size
distribution of IPs (Fig. 7c). In addition,we examined inmore detail thecurring on: (a) all proactively culled farms; (b) cattle and mixed farms; (c) sheep only
) farms culled before May 10th (h) farms culled after May 10th.
28 I. Chis Ster et al. / Epidemics 1 (2009) 21–34extent to which themodel reproduced the spatial variation seen in the
data by using the per-farm infection hazards estimated by inference
model itself to calculate the expected number of infections through
timeby5 regions: Devon, Cumbria, Scotland,Wales and rest of England
(Tildesley et al., 2006). The temporal proﬁle of the epidemics is well
reproduced in Fig. 8, in part because the calculation of the expected
incidence at a point in time conditions on the previously observed
cases in each region. But discrepancies between overall expected and
observed numbers of cases by region reﬂects themodel over or under-
estimating regional variation in infection hazards — and hence
variation in the data not captured by the model. It can be seen thatFig. 7. Simulation of the 2001 epidemic (see Appendix B for simulation model details)
using the parameter estimates from the default model. (a) Daily and cumulative
incidences of IPs are plotted, and compared with the 2001 epidemic data. The
simulation average is shown, together with the 95% range (in grey); (b) Spatial density
of cases (number of cases per 9 km×9 km square) in the 2001 epidemic compared with
the average density from the simulation; (c) Distribution of the size (number of
animals) of IPs stratiﬁed by species, comparing data from 2001 with the simulation
average; (d) as (a), but simulation results show epidemic in the absence of CP culling.
Averages were calculated from 1000 realisations.while there is unexplained variation (particularly in Scotland), the
model explains much of the variation seen (see Discussion).
This correspondence gives conﬁdence in the reliability of our
parameter estimates and our ability to infer something about the
effectiveness of different control policies. A key question we can then
address is the extent to which the controversial CP cull policy was
necessary for the control of the 2001 epidemic. Fig. 7d shows the
predicted evolution of the 2001 epidemic (generated by the simula-
tion with the mean posterior parameter values from the default
model) had no CP culling been undertaken. We predict that the
epidemic would have been much larger, with almost double the
number of IPs by October 2001. Of course, this is a slightly unfair
comparison, as had no CP culling been undertaken, then arguably
more resources could have been given to DC culling and faster IP
culling — which may have at least partly reproduced the effect of the
CP cull on transmission. A detailed exploration of these issues is the
topic of a separate paper in preparation.
Last, we tested the accuracy and power of the inference model by
generating 6 different simulated datasets of the same format as the real
2001 epidemic dataset, and using the inference model to estimate
epidemiological parameters from each of these datasets. The results
shown inTable 4 indicate that, in the absence ofmodelmis-speciﬁcation
(the simulation and inference models used the same underlying
transmission and reporting model), the inference model is capable of
robustly estimating epidemiological parameters and the number of
hidden infections. The results in Table 4 also show that adding random
noise to the estimated infection times did not substantially change any
of the estimates. Introducing a systematic error to the to the infection
times (by subtracting a uniformly distributed random number between
0 and 3 days) only has a limited impact of the reliability of most
parameter estimates, though the estimatedmean time from infection to
report increases to around 9.7 days and the infectiousness proﬁle of
farms is estimated to peak at 3–3.5 days (Table 4). In a similar fashion,
we tested the inference method for models allowing for a change in
farms' infectiousness after their reporting date: the parameter estimates
quantifying the drop exhibit comparable range of values as those
estimated from the data (Table 5).
Discussion
This paper has demonstrated the power of modern inferential
frameworks for estimating key transmission parameters from closely
but partially observed epidemics. While remaining highly computa-
tionally intensive, the reversible jump MCMC methods adopted here
represent the state-of the art in statistical inference for epidemics
where detailed data on individual cases are available. Given that data
augmentation can also correct for as yet unobserved infections during
an epidemic, we feel that the methods developed here will be a
valuable addition to simpler approaches (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b;
Haydon et al., 2003) for use in real-time in a epidemic — though they
would only be suitable for application once 50 or more cases had
accumulated. Also, the computational burden of reversible jump
MCMC means that it might not yet be suited to producing, say, daily
updates during an outbreak.
The parameter estimates generated by inferential models are key
inputs for epidemic models used in control policy optimisation and
preparedness. It is therefore very encouraging that when we used the
parameter estimates generated by our inferential model in an
equivalent (see Appendix B) simulation, the simulated epidemics
thus generated matched the actual 2001 outbreak well (Fig. 7).
While other studies have parameterised simulation models to give
output similarly close to the 2001 outbreak (Keeling et al., 2001, 2003;
Tildesley et al., 2006), this has only previously been achieved by
tuning regionally-varying parameters so that average simulation
results match the observed epidemic(Tildesley et al., 2006), or by
similarly ﬁtting national transmission parameters but then making
Fig. 8. Time series of observed/predicted number of infections in 5 different regions using the farm-level hazards: (a) Scotland, (b) Wales, (c) Devon, (d) the rest of England,
(e) Cumbria and (f) throughout Great Britain.
29I. Chis Ster et al. / Epidemics 1 (2009) 21–34post-hoc adjustments of the input demographic data to themodel (i.e.
reducing sheep densities in Wales) (Keeling et al., 2001, 2003).
Our conﬁdence in the model goodness of ﬁt is reinforced by the
extent to which the simulation model parameterised using the
inference model parameter estimates was able not just to reproduce
the pattern of the 2001 outbreak, but in many cases predict exactly
which farmswould become infected. On average, in any one run of the
simulation model 13% of the simulated IPs were also IPs in the actual
2001 epidemic. Furthermore, on average, 28% of simulated IPs were
within 1 km of a real IP in 2001, rising to 45% being within 3 km. This
level of predictability is unexpectedly high given the simulations were
only conditioned on the state of the epidemic on 23rd February 2001,
when there were approximately 50 cases.
We adopted themeasure of model goodness of ﬁt used by Tildesley
et al. (2006) to evaluate how well the simulation model reproduced
the 2001 epidemic using our estimates (Table 1 and Appendix B). The
proportion of model runs for which the differences in the cumulative
number of culled farms between that model run and the other runsare less than the differences between the data and the model runs is
similar or better than the result of Tildesley et al. (2006) in 4 out of
5 regions, and only marginally worse in one region (Scotland, which
is not well reproduced by either model). This indicates that it is
possible to achieve similar goodness of ﬁt to that achieved in that
study (Tildesley et al., 2006) without using region-speciﬁc transmis-
sion parameters.
That said, the ﬁt we achieve to the geographic distribution of cases
seen in 2001 is reasonably good. This can be seen without relying on
simulation results by examining the expected number of infections by
region through time calculated directly from the farm-level infection
hazards estimated by the inference model (Fig. 8). Overall, the case
numbers in Cumbria, Wales and ‘rest of England’ are reproduced well.
Case numbers in Devon are over-estimated by the model by 32% (213
expected versus 161 observed), while case numbers in Scotland are
underestimated by 23% (137 expected versus 179 observed). The
discrepancy in Scotland may in part be due to differences in the
collection and format of the agricultural census data there in 2001
Table 4
Performance of inference model evaluated on 6 simulated data sets (1 per column)
Simulated epidemic size Small Average Large
Reported cases 944 1377 1988 2126 2376 2457
Hidden infections 152 230 361 320 364 456
Proactively culled 2890 3934 6310 5879 6322 6559
Parameters True value Estimates: posterior means 95% credible intervals
k=total number of hidden infections – 135 215 336 293 334 335
(113, 155) (187, 248) (296, 365 (260, 237) (290, 368) (301, 380)
RS=susceptibility ratio (cattle:sheep) 5.40 5.03 5.43 5.24 5.26 5.13 5.50
(4.01, 6.13) (4.72, 6.14) (4.56, 6.19) (4.44, 4.94) (4.53, 5.83) (4.82, 6.15)
RI=infectivity ratio (cattle:sheep) 2.24 2.46 2.23 2.33 2.83 2.76 2.61
(1.48, 3.21) (1.63, 3.22) (1.81, 3.00) (2.29, 3.47) (2.19, 3.42) (2.02,3.50)
β0=baseline transmission coeff. 6290 6398 6395 6397 6402 (99) 6401 6403
(6212, 6589) (6199, 6607) (6190, 6587) (6101,6533) (6203, 6612) (6198,6596)
DS=farm size scale parameter for cattle 226 218 214 212 212 224 217
(199, 237) (195, 236) (198, 234) (192, 227) (209, 239) (295, 234)
DI=farm size scale parameter for sheep 35 38 38 34 38 34 44
(28, 49) (29, 47) (27, 42) (30, 46) (27, 44) (31, 50)
γ=spatial kernel power 2.9 2.88 2.96 2.84 2.86 2.85 2.88
(2.79, 2.96) (2.87, 3.06 (2.79, 2.92) (2.78, 2.92) (2.81, 2.90) (2.84, 2.95)
Infection to report distribution mean 8.2 8.19 8.30 8.08 8.29 8.25 8.32
(7.97, 8.44) (8.18, 8.43) (7.94, 8.21) (8.19, 8.38) (8.11, 8.36) (8.21, 8.41)
Day post infection infectiousness peaks 3.4 3.24 3.30 3.33 3.35 3.33 3.37
(3.04, 3.42) (3.22, 3.41) (3.25, 3.43) (3.29, 3.43) (3.28, 3.44) (3.30, 3.47)
δ=increase in transmission before peak and in tail of epidemic 1.15 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.14 1.10 1.14
(0.93, 1.22) (0.97, 1.19) (0.99, 1.20) (1.05, 1.24) (1.02, 1.21) (1.04, 1.17)
Random noise
Uniform (−2, 2)
Infection to report distribution mean 8.2 8.3 8.30 8.25 8.28 8.31 8.34
(8.18, 8.57) (8.13, 8.47) (8.08, 8.40) (8.20, 8.56) (8.16, 8.47) (8.20, 8.47)
Day post infection infectiousness peaks 3.4 3.27 3.30 3.23 3.20 3.36 3.34
(3.07, 3.45) (3.17, 3.40) (3.05, 3.41) (3.21, 3.41) (3.24, 3.46) (3.25, 3.44)
δ=increase in transmission 1.15 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.15 1.13 1.10
(0.93, 1.26) (0.95, 1.19) (0.95, 1.14) (1.05, 1.25) (1.03, 1.24) (0.94, 1.23)
Systematic error
Uniform (−3, 0)
Infection to report distribution mean 8.2 9.69 9.76 9.73 9.87 9.75 9.76
(9.47, 9.95) (9.59, 9.94) (9.57, 9.92) (9.74, 10.05) (9.63, 9.88) (9.64, 9.87)
Day post infection infectiousness peaks 3.4 3.31 3.20 3.22 2.94 3.10 3.11
(3.07, 3.50) (3.09, 3.30) (3.10, 3.31) (2.74, 3.10) (2.97, 3.21) (3.01, 3.20)
δ=increase in transmission 1.15 1.0 1.07 1.05 1.16 1.12 1.12
(0.94, 1.20) (0.97, 1.16) (0.94, 1.16) (1.06, 1.27) (1.02, 1.22) (1.04, 1.23)
Estimated posterior mean and 95% credible intervals of key parameters are listed. The estimates in the ‘Random noise’ sectionwere obtained fromversions of the simulated data sets
inwhich each IP infection time had a uniform random number between−2 and+2 added to it. For the ‘Systematic error’ results, a random number between 0 and 3 was subtracted
from the infection times in the simulated data. Model with time-varying infectiousness but no drop in IP infectiousness after report has been used.
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in different regions are also well-reproduced, except in the ‘rest of
England’ region, where the rate of increase in case numbers up until
the end of March is under-estimated (Fig. 8d). The tail of the epidemic
is very well captured in Cumbria, ‘rest of England’ and overall.
While the timing of the infection of individual farms can be much
less well predicted, the level of ‘determinism’ in the epidemic process
our analysis has revealed may make detailed real-time prediction
more feasible. Indeed, given real-time prediction conditions on the
current state of an epidemic rather than the state at some early
selected time point, one might expect to do rather better than the
degree of correspondence seen here between observations and data,
especially later in the epidemic. Conversely, real-time prediction is
only as reliable as the parameter estimates available and early in an
outbreak there is inevitably limited statistical power. In addition, the
methods developed in this paper need to be extended to account for
right-censoring (i.e. the delay in detecting infected farms).
Overall, however, more work is needed on developing robust
measures of goodness-of-ﬁt for the type of spatiotemporal inferential
models developed here, together with investigation of the sensitivity
of estimates to model misspeciﬁcation.Two new features of the transmission model we have used in this
study help explain the good ﬁt to the 2001 data achieved. The ﬁrst is
the relaxation of previous assumptions of linear scaling of farm
susceptibility and infectiousness with the number of animals. For all
themodel variants examined, we foundmarkedly sub-linear scaling—
especially for sheep, where susceptibility and infectiousness rapidly
saturate for farms with over about 50 sheep (Fig. 4a).
The second novel feature is our use of a time-varying infectiousness
proﬁle for farms and/or allowing for infectiousness to change after an
IP is reported. Our use of a gamma function for farm infectiousness over
time is intended to be a crude representation of within-farm infection
dynamics. Allowing for a change in infectiousness after an IP reports
infection represents the potential effect of restrictions placed on farms.
In reality, the two factors are confounded (see Fig. 3b), but models with
either time-varying infectiousness or a change in infectiousness after
report gave substantially better log likelihood values than models with
a ﬁxed latent period and then constant infectiousness until culling
occurs (which were the default assumptions of past studies; Keeling et
al., 2001, 2003; Chis Ster, 2007). Furthermore, only models with time-
varying infectiousness closely reproduced the 2001 epidemic when
best ﬁt parameters were used in the simulation model.
Table 5
Performance of inference model evaluated on 6 simulated data sets relatively to the drop in IPs' infectiousness after their reporting date
Simulated epidemic size Small Average Large
Reported cases 1261 1129 1993 2038 2148 2193
Hidden infections 202 186 343 307 355 363
Proactively culled 4851 4413 6773 6547 5900 6848
Parameters True value Estimates: posterior means 95% credible intervals
k=total number of hidden infections – 190 166 311 282 323 338
(164, 207) (143, 193) (279, 345) (247, 308) (290, 357) (305, 370)
RS=susceptibility ratio (cattle:sheep) 5.35 6.22 5.68 5.25 5.87 5.39 5.51
(5.27, 7.29) (4.85, 6.90) (4.60, 5.98) (4.94, 6.85) (4.84, 6.01) (4.73, 6.40)
RI=infectivity ratio (cattle:sheep) 2.61 2.58 3.11 2.69 3.05 2.68 2.49
(2.05, 3.07) (2.12, 3.97) (2.19, 3.25) (2.44, 3.67) (2.09, 3.31) (1.98, 2.94)
Infection to report distribution mean 8.21 8.08 8.01 8.07 8.07 8.09 8.08
(7.90, 8.23) (7.84, 8.21) (7.95, 8.21) (7.96, 8.21) (7.98, 8.21) (7.97, 8.21)
Day post infection infectiousness peaks 3.40 3.15 2.99 3.24 3.21 3.29 3.29
(2.87, 3.41) (2.57, 3.41) (3.03, 3.42) (3.04,3.41) (3.15, 3.42) (3.15, 3.47)
δ=increase in transmission before peak and in tail of epidemic 1.25 1.19 1.13 1.32 1.14 1.23 1.18
(1.07, 1.31) (1.00, 1.26) (1.19, 1.47) (1.03, 1.25) (1.11, 1.39) (1.08, 1.32)
η=factor reduction in IP infectiousness post report 25 30 30 32 35 38 32
(15, 52) (16, 47) (18, 43) (18, 54) (19, 57) (19, 44)
Random noise
Uniform (−2, 2)
Infection to report distribution mean 8.21 8.03 8.01 8.11 8.06 8.05 8.12
(7.86, 8.20) (7.79, 8.21) (7.97, 8.22) (7.90, 8.21) (7.91, 8.21) (8.01, 8.23)
Day post infection infectiousness peaks 3.40 3.09 3.04 3.15 3.09 3.32 3..20
(2.68, 3.40) (2.77, 3.40) (2.69, 3.53) (2.77, 3.40) (3.05, 3.55) (2.73, 3.43)
δ=increase in transmission 1.25 1.20 1.14 1.28 1.15 1.23 1.17
(1.07, 1.34) (1.05, 1.25) (1.16, 1.41) (1.04, 1.28) (1.08, 1.39) (1.07, 1.27)
η=reduction in infectiousness post report 25 33 30 35 39 35 32
(18, 54) (17, 46) (17, 54) (22, 54) (21, 47) (18, 48)
Systematic error
Uniform (−3, 0)
Infection to report distribution mean 8.21 9.27 9.42 9.48 9.61 9.38 9.45
(9.08, 9.46) (9.24, 9.61) (9.34, 9.63) (9.46, 9.80) (9.25, 9.51) (9.32, 9.59)
Day post infection infectiousness peaks 3.40 3.15 3.04 3.19 3.03 3.15 3.22
(2.88, 3.40) (2.53, 3.41) (2.96, 3.41) (2.59, 3.41) (2.91, 3.40) (3.00, 3.41)
δ=increase in transmission 1.25 1.18 1.14 1.30 1.15 1.21 1.20
(1.06, 1.32) (1.04, 1.25) (1.16, 1.45) (1.05, 1.26) (1.09, 1.37) (1.09, 1.35)
η=reduction in infectiousness post report 25 36 32 37 29 31 39
(22, 52) (15, 56) (23, 49) (16, 44) (11, 46) (20, 60)
Random noise’ and ‘Systematic error’ sections as Table 4. Model with time-varying infectiousness and drop in IP infectiousness after report has been used. The drop in infectiousness
is estimated within similar range of values if a random/systematic error is added to the estimated infection times.
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diagnosed as an IP (but before it is culled) was included in the
model, the ﬁtted infectiousness after report was always (even at the
upper 95% credible interval) less than 5% of that before. The model
variants including this factor also had substantially better log
likelihood values than those without. Overall, this would seem to
indicate a very high level of effectiveness of the biosecurity and
movement restrictions placed on a farm after diagnosis. However,
just because of the risk of confounding of this parameter with
changes in farm infectiousness driven by intrinsic within-farm
dynamics or other factors, we remain rather cautious about over-
interpreting this result in the absence of other datasets which might
yield independent estimates of the effectiveness of restrictions. For
instance, one of the naive conclusions one can draw if IP restrictions
are truly as effective as our estimates suggest is that the speed with
which an IP is culled is relatively unimportant. This is such a
signiﬁcant conclusion that we would feel uncomfortable endorsing it
without additional supporting data.
The most important epidemiological difference between the time-
varying and ﬂat infectiousnessmodel variants is the imputed impact of
more rapid IP culling. For all the models with time-varying infectious-
ness and/or a change of infectiousness after report, IPs were estimated
to have only a low level of infectiousness after report— either becauseof the effect of restrictions, or because infectiousness peaked several
days earlier. Thus more rapid IP culling is predicted to have had a very
limited impact. Consequently, CP culling was inferred to have had a
much more important role in controlling the 2001 epidemic than is
estimated assuming constant infectiousness. Indeed we estimate that
without CP culling, the 2001 epidemic might have been almost two
fold larger (in number of IPs) thanwas observed, andwouldhave taken
substantially longer to eliminate.
It may therefore be thought to be paradoxical that we estimate
relatively only around 207 unobserved infections were hidden among
theproactively culled farms in 2001. Such anumberonly represents 2.8%
of the 7455 farms culled, implying the culling policy was remarkably
poorly targeted. This criticism is in part well founded — we estimate a
mere 1.5% (40 farms) of the 3156 (mostly sheep) farms which were
culled under policies other than DC or CP culling were actually infected.
Simulation using parameters estimated with the inference model
indicate these culls had a negligible epidemiological impact, in large
part because of the low susceptibility and infectiousness of sheep.
However, CP and DC culling had a muchmore substantial impact— not
because of the removal of farms which were already infected, but by
reducing the local density of susceptible farms in a targeted manner
(Haydon et al., 2004). In that sense, CP culling had the same impact on
transmission as an instantaneously acting and perfect vaccine.
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in transmission during the time period the epidemic was in steepest
decline (i.e. 26 March–10 May 2001), in agreement with past analyses
(Ferguson et al., 2001a,b). We found that while it was possible to
match the cumulative number of IPs and culled farms by region with
models which did not incorporate temporal changes in transmission
coefﬁcients (as did Tildesley et al., 2006), achieving a close match to
the precise temporal evolution of the 2001 epidemic required
temporal changes to be included. In reality, transmission parameters
in the 2001 epidemic probably varied continuously over time (and
indeed spatially), reﬂecting changes in the rigour with which controls
(such as restrictions on animal movements) were enforced and the
compliance of farms with biosecurity and movement controls.
However, it undoubtedly would be more satisfying to not need to
incorporate temporal changes in parameters into the model and
instead have such changes generated mechanistically or by other
covariates. This is the topic of ongoing research.
As commented above, there is almost certainly room for improving
the quality of model ﬁt to the 2001 epidemic data — or, equivalently,
explaining more of the detailed patterns seen in the spatio-temporal
evolution of that epidemic. One factor not allowed for in the current
analysis includes the fragmentation of individual agricultural hold-
ings, shown in 2001 to be a signiﬁcant predictor of transmission
intensity (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b), and one which may have also
played a role in the much smaller 2007 UK outbreak. Information on
fragmentation is only available for around two thirds of holdings,
however, and developing robust approaches to reconstructing the
missing information would have added substantial additional com-
plication to the analysis presented here. Another factor highlighted by
the results of this study is possible underlying differences in the
infection-to-report delay distribution for sheep farms compared with
cattle farms. Thirdly, temporal changes in transmission coefﬁcients
have only been incorporated crudely into this model. Methods such as
sequential MCMC (Cauchemez et al., 2008) might allow for non-
parametric estimation of time-varying transmission rates.
A further issue is the extent to which farms culled as DCs had a
higher risk of infection than accounted for in our model. The current
inferential framework assumed that DCs had no higher risk of
infection beyond that speciﬁed by their proximity to existing IPs
and their composition. In reality, the designation of a farm as a DC can
often involve prior knowledge of the existence of one ormore contacts
with diagnosed IPs. Fitting an inﬂating factor in the probability of
transmission accounting for a risk enhancement for such farms close
to their culling date is a natural extension of the current model. We
attempted to do this, but preliminary results indicated difﬁculty in
identifying the parameter, with estimated values close to (though
above) one, and all other estimates similar to those already reported.
Future workmaking use of data on known contacts (Cook et al., 2008)
will consider this issue more fully.
We also assumed all reported IPs in 2001 were actually infected in
this study. In reality, signiﬁcant numbers of IPs may have been
misdiagnosed (Savill et al., 2007). Allowing for this possibility is
feasible within the RJMCMC framework we developed. Indeed such an
analysis could make use of the serological and virological testing data
collected during the epidemic (which the analysis presented here did
not), which showed that only 75% of the 1762 IPs fromwhich samples
were collected had the clinical diagnosis of FMD conﬁrmed by
serological or virological testing. However, the added complexity of
modelling test sensitivity and handling the 14% of IPs for which no lab
tests were undertaken means we leave this as a topic for future study.
Lastly, our analysis suggests that the 2001 data may be informative
enough to permit ﬁtting parsimonious models of within-farm
dynamics embedded within a between-farm transmission model.
This would enable more mechanistic explanations for the time
evolution of infectiousness on farms to be explored, including how
differences in farms size and compositionmight affect those dynamics.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A. Inference framework
Let N denote the total number of farms in the population R, the
total reported (observed) IPs and C, the total number of culled
farms. Thus C−R is the number of proactively culled farms. We
also denote by k the number of possible hidden infections within
the set of proactively culled farms. The number of farms surviving
the epidemic is the S=N−C. Further, let X=(x0, x1,…, xN) be the
locations of all farms, IR=(t0, t1,…, tR), the infection times of
reported IPs, I=(IR, Ik), the joint set of ordered infection times of
both reported IPs and hidden infections, R=(r0, r1,… rR), the
reporting times of observed IPs, C=(c0, c1,…cR,…cC), the ordered
set of culling times of both reported IPs and proactively culled farms,
and S, the set of farms not infected in the epidemic (surviving and
culled but not infected). The vector of transmission parameters is
given by: θT=(β0, RS, RI, A, B, a, γ, η, δ, α1, α2).
The force of infection on farm i at time t is given by
λi tð Þ=∑
i≠j
λij tð ÞIij tð Þ ð8Þ
where λij (t) is deﬁned in the main text, and
Iij tð Þ=
1; if the farm i is susceptible and the farm j is
infectious at the time t
0; otherwise
8><>: ð9Þ
It should be noted that, in common with all other published
transmission models of the 2001 FMD epidemic, this expression for
the force of infection assuming hazards are additive— namely that the
overall hazard of infection for a susceptible farm is the linear sum of
the forces of infection from each infectious farm. It would be
interesting to vary this assumption, though it lies beyond the scope
of the current study.
Because we no longer assumed infection times to be known in this
study, we also need to model the interval from infection to report
probabilistically. We model this with a Gamma distribution:
G tð Þ= μ

C μð Þ t
−1 exp −μtð Þ; tN0 ð10Þ
where υ and μ are parameters. The corresponding survival function
(cumulative probability function) is denoted SG(t).
The contributions of the observations to the log likelihood are from
three categories of farms: infected and reported (observed IPs), infected
farms which were not reported prior to culling (hidden infections
among proactively culled farms) and uninfected farms. Respectively:
lIRi = logλi tið Þ−∫
ti
T0
λi τð Þdτ+ log G ri−tið Þð Þ ð11Þ
tilIki = log λi tið Þð Þ−∫
T0
λi τð Þdτ+ log SG ci−tið Þð Þ ð12Þ
lSi =− ∫
min
T0
Tfinal; cið Þλi τð Þdτ ð13Þ
where T0 is February 23rd 2001 (the time the national movement ban
was imposed) Tﬁnal and is 5th October 2001 (just after the last cull
occurred).
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times are reported as days) we discretised time in units of 1 day, and
thus in evaluating these likelihoods we used discretised versions of
the instantaneous and integrated infection hazard and the infection to
report delay distribution. The infection-to-report delay distribution
was also discretised.
Adding the infection-to-report distribution parameters to the
transmission parameters gives the complete set of estimated para-
meters:
θ= θT ; ; μð Þ= β0;RS;RI;A;B; a;γ; η; δ;α1;α2; ; μð Þ ð14Þ
Note that throughout this analysis we are conditioning on the
infected farms present on 23rd February 2001; i.e. we do not attempt
tomodel the ‘silent-spread’ phase of the epidemic before the outbreak
was detected and movement controls imposed.
Both the unobserved infection times of reported IPs and the
infection times of hidden infections are modelled as nuisance
parameters. The dimension of the hidden infection times vector, k, is
also a parameter of the model. The complete data log likelihood for a
particular state of the system with k hidden infections is then:
lk θjI;R;C;Xð Þ= ∑
iaIR
lIRi +∑
iaIk
lIki +∑
iaS
lSi ð15Þ
Changing the number of hidden infections changes the dimensio-
nality of the parameter space, necessitating the use of a reversible
jump MCMC scheme (Green, 1995; Brooks et al., 2003). The
methodology was developed by Green (1995) and is a generalization
of the classical Metropolis–Hastings (Hastings, 1970) algorithm. It
applies to statistical problems where the dimension of the object of
interest is not ﬁxed by allowing construction of reversible Markov
chains samplers that jump between parameter subspaces of different
dimensionality.
Denoting by Lk θjI;R;C;Xð Þ the likelihood for the state of the system
with k latent (unobserved) infections (i.e. the exponential of the log
likelihood deﬁned in Eq. (15)), the likelihood presented in Table 1 is
the likelihood of the data, calculated as
L θjR;C;Xð Þ~∫ Lk θjI;R;C;Xð Þ×p IjR;C;Xð ÞdI ð16Þ
where p IjR;C;Xð Þ is the predictive density of the latent data I given the
observed data (R,C,X).
Non informative priors are assumed for the main transmission and
infection-to-report distribution parameters θ, but the nuisance
parameters are informed by the data on estimated infection dates of
IPs generated by vets who evaluated the age of lesions in detected IPs.
As a prior on the infection time of IP i, we therefore assumed a normal
distribution centred on the estimated infection time, ti0, with a
standard deviation of σprior days, and right-truncated by the reporting
date of the IP, ri. Mathematically, we represent this as:
tieRTNprior tijt0i ;σprior; ri 
The main updating step in the reversible jump algorithm can be
summarized as follows. For the observed infections, the proposal
distribution for infection times is
tnewi fU t
old
i −σprop;min ri; toldi +σprop
  
ð17Þ
where U(a,b) is the uniform distribution on (a,b), and σprop controls
the jump size in the randomwalk. Newly imputed infection dates are
drawn from the proposal distribution
tnewi fU ci−σhidden; ci
 
ð18Þ
where σhidden is chosen to be larger than the typical interval from
the estimated infection time to report time of observed IPs. Thealgorithm is designed for a retrospective study, so we do not allow for
right censoring due to the epidemic not being completed at the point
of analysis.
Since the inference model used discrete time, imputed infection
times were rounded the nearest integer number of days.
Our overall algorithm for the RJMCMC update step is as follows:
1. Update the main parameters in bloc using classical random walk
used as proposal (Chis Ster, 2007).
2. Update the nuisance parameters, by drawing a farm from the
combined set of infected and proactively culled farms:
2.1. If the farm is a reported IP, we propose a new infection time as
in Eq. (17), and the move is accepted with the probability
α= min
(
1;
)
RTNprior tnewi jt0i ;σprior; ri
 
Lk

θ; IR− toldi
n o
+ tnewi
	 

; Ik;R;C;X;YÞ min toldi +σprop; ri
 
− toldi −σprop
  
RTNprior toldi jt0i ;σprior; ri
 
Lk θ; IR; Ik;R;C;X;Yð Þ
 min tnewi + σprop; ri
 
− tnewi −σprop
  
2.2. If it is an infected but not reported farm, we either:
2.2.1. With a probability of 1/2 we attempt to remove it from the
set of infections, and accept with probability
α= min 1;
2
σhidden
Lk−1 θ; IR; Ik− toldi
	 

;R;C;X;Y
 
Lk θ; IR; Ik;R;C;X;Yð Þ
( )
ð19Þ
2.2.2. Or to propose a new infection time as in Eq. (18), and
accept with probability
α= min 1;
Lk θ; IR; Ik− toldi
	 

+ tnewi
	 

;R;C;X;Y
 
Lk θ; IR; Ik;R;C;X;Yð Þ
( )
ð20Þ
2.3. If the farm selected is a proactively culled but not infected
farm, we propose a new infection time as in Eq. (18) and
accept with probability
α= min 1;
σhidden
2
Lk + 1 θ; IR; Ik + tnewi
	 

;R;C;X;Y
 
Lk θ; IR; Ik;R;C;X;Yð Þ
( )
ð21Þ
See Green (1995) and Brooks et al. (2003) for more details on
conjugate acceptance ratios for reversible jump MCMC. In reality,
after some tuning, we found good convergence when we updated the
nuisance parameter hyperspace (imputed/removed/updated infec-
tion times) 250 times for each update of the main parameters θ and
thinned the sampling by recording only 1 in 25 of these iterations.
One million iterations were used for burn-in and the marginal
distributions were summarized across approximately 4 million
iterations. A single chain took 4–5 days to produce, running
parallelised (using OpenMP 2.0) on 2 cores of 3GHz Intel Xeon
system. Convergence was assessed visually and the MCMC chains
looked well mixed. The overall rate of acceptancewas approx 14%. The
rate of imputing/removing new infections (calculated as the ratio
between the number of accepted and attempted moves) was approx
1.12%.
Strong correlations between some parameters were reduced by
reparameterisation where possible. For instance, we estimated the
mean and the variance of the Gamma distribution for the time from
infection to report distribution, and peak and the power of the gamma
function used to model the variation of farm infectiousness with time.
Appendix B. Simulation model
While simulating the transmissionmodel outlined in the main text
is relatively straightforward, thought needs to be given as to how to
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inferential model, estimation conditions on the culling which took
place. However, in a simulation while we condition on the initial
conditions, the exact sequence of farms which are then infected is
random. We cannot therefore just cull the same farms at the same
time as were culled in the real epidemic, but need instead to
reproduce the processes which generated the observed culling. The
simulation we developed implemented IP, DC and CP culling in the
following manner:1. IP culling. The delay from reporting of an IP to its culling was
modelled as a lognormal distribution, with a mean and variance
which varied with chronological time from the start of the
simulation (representing 23rd February 2001), and was ﬁtted to
the delays observed during the 2001 epidemic.
2. DC culling. To model DC culling, we subdivided the infection
process into a contact process (occurring at some multiple of the
rate of the infection) process, and a probabilistic ‘infection given
contact’ process. We modelled contacts as occurring at 6 times
the rate of the original infection process, with one sixth of
contacts being infected on contact. The advantage of this
approach is that while the transmission dynamics remain
unaltered, one can also track uninfected contacts picked with
the same probabilistic rules as infected contacts. To model DC
culling, we selected 2/3 of the contacts of each IP as potential
DCs, assuming that infected contacts were marginally (approx
10%) more likely to be picked as DCs than non-infected contacts.
The actual numbers of these preselected DCs culled in the
simulation was determined by the empirical ratio of DC to IP
culling observed in the real 2001 epidemic at that particular time
point and in the region in which the IP arose (the same regions
were used as for IP culling). The empirical DC to IP culling ratio
was smoothed through time to eliminate large ﬂuctuations due
to stochastic noise. This algorithm accurately reproduces the
regional and temporal variations seen in DC culling in the 2001
epidemics.
3. CP culling. We did not have precise adjacency information for all
farms in GB in 2001, so adjacency was estimated via Voronoi
tessellation. For each new IP which arises in the simulation, a
ﬁxed proportion of the CPs identiﬁed via this tessellation
algorithm were culled so as to reproduce the regionally and
temporally varying empirical CP:IP cull ratios seen in the real
epidemic (again smoothed in time to eliminate stochastic
ﬂuctuations).
For both DC and CP culling there is a second challenge: it is often
difﬁcult to attribute DCs and CPs culled in the real epidemic to the IP
that ‘generated’ them — the spatially clustered nature of the
transmission process meant that farms were often DCs or CPs of
multiple IPs, and data to allow attribution are often missing or
equivocal. It is therefore also difﬁcult to assess the delay which
occurred between an IP being identiﬁed or culled and some of its DCs/
CPs being culled (CP culling rarely affected more than 3 CPs of any one
IP). We therefore made the simple assumption that DCs and CPs were
culled after their generating IP was culled, with the precise timing
being determined by how culling capacity varied through time.Culling capacity was determined by matching to the (smoothed)
empirical DC:IP and CP:IP culling ratios seen in the 2001 epidemic in
different regions.References
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